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10.1  Introduction 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) entered into an agreement with 
the Department of  Defense (DOD) in  1975 to develop a measure of defense 
purchases in constant prices and an official defense deflator. Prior to this ef- 
fort, no official measures of  price change for purchases of  military-specific 
goods and services had been developed. Initial results of  the study and the 
methodology were published in  the report Price Changes in  Defense Pur- 
chases of the United States (U.S. Department of  Commerce 1979). Current- 
and constant-dollar estimates of defense purchases were incorporated into the 
national income and product accounts (NIPA) with the 1972 benchmark pub- 
lished in December  1980. Quarterly and annual series are available for the 
period 1972 to date and are published in the Survey of Current Business. 
This paper may be considered a sequel to the general overview of the defla- 
tion  of  defense purchases found in  an  earlier work  (Ziemer and  Galbraith 
1983). Although the paper focuses on aircraft, the techniques described apply 
to most other purchases of  weapons systems by DOD. Defense purchases in 
constant dollars, other than weapons systems and compensation, are generally 
derived by  deflation. Specification pricing, the same technique as employed 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is used to develop price indexes from 
data on prices paid by DOD. These indexes are used to deflate current-dollar 
defense purchases. Categories of purchases for which price data are not avail- 
able from DOD are deflated using proxy price indexes such as the producer 
price index (PPI). Constant-dollar purchases of military compensation are de- 
rived by  extrapolating base year compensation by  the number of  active duty 
personnel by rank. Constant-dollar purchases of civilian compensation are de- 
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rived by extrapolating base year compensation by the number of hours worked 
by employees by grade and step. A more detailed description of the method- 
ology used in estimating the full range of national defense purchases may be 
found in U.S. Department of Commerce (1988). 
The purpose of the paper is to describe in some detail the types of data that 
are available to BEA and the techniques  used to transform  these data into 
current- and constant-dollar defense purchases of  aircraft. The paper is di- 
vided into three sections. The first section briefly reviews the general pricing 
techniques used in the development of prices for military equipment. The de- 
scription focuses primarily  on  the  way  in  which certain price-determining 
characteristics are treated and how this may differ from other price indexes 
such as the PPI and the consumer price index (CPI). 
The second section, which contains the bulk of the paper, gives a detailed 
look at these techniques using a case study approach. We  have devised price 
and quantity data for two hypothetical fighter aircraft. These data are used to 
portray many of the situations that we observe in the actual data. We hope that 
this detailed methodology will shed some light on what the published defense 
purchases series does and does not show. 
The third section contains a brief summary of defense purchases of aircraft. 
These data illustrate the effect of these techniques on actual data. 
10.1.1  Background 
The goal of the defense price work was to develop measures of  constant- 
dollar defense purchases within the framework of the NIPAs (U.S. Depart- 
ment of Commerce  1979, 21). This goal, coupled with the procedures used 
by DOD for purchasing weapons systems, dictated many of  the procedures 
used in constructing the measures of price change. Following is a brief review 
of some of these procedures. 
Defense purchases in the NIPAs are recorded  on  a delivery  basis.  This 
means that during the period that a given aircraft is being manufactured and 
DOD is making progress payments to the producer, BEA does not record a 
defense purchase. The progress payments appear as additions to business in- 
ventories. The purchase is recorded only when DOD takes delivery of  the 
completed unit; at that time, there is also recorded  a reduction  in  business 
inventories. The time lag between initiating production and the delivery of a 
completed unit can be as much as four years for some aircraft. 
Most weapons systems are purchased by DOD as components of a system 
rather than as a single item. An aircraft, for example, usually has four major 
component contracts: engines,  avionics (i.e., electronic devices for use  in 
aviation), armament, and the airframe and assembly. In addition, there may 
be many smaller components that are purchased separately, such as tires and 
ejection seats. The engines, avionics, etc., appear as a defense purchase in the 
GNP when DOD accepts the item from the contractor, and at that time the 
price for these components will appear in the defense price index. These com- 309  The Deflation of  Military Aircraft 
ponents are then furnished to the airframe and  assembly contractor. When 
DOD accepts the completed aircraft, only the delivery of  the airframe and 
assembly operation is recorded as a defense purchase in the GNP-the  other 
components having been accepted earlier-and  only then do the airframe and 
assembly price appear in the defense purchases price index. 
Defense purchases of weapons systems in the NIPAs are derived primarily 
from data on quantities and prices of components delivered in each time pe- 
riod. The basic series are calculated as follows: 
(4) 
where  C  = deliveries  in  current  dollars,  D  = implicit  price  deflator, 
P  = price of  item at delivery, t = time period of delivery, i = ith compo- 
nent (i =  1, n),  K  = deliveries in constant dollars, I  = fixed-weighted price 
index, Q = quantity of item delivered, and b = base period. 
While price and quantity estimates are collected and processed for many 
series, there are some items for which data are not readily available. For these 
items, an alternative measure for the purchase is used. Data on disbursements 
for a class of weapons systems (e.g., Air Force combat aircraft) are available 
from DOD. These data are adjusted to exclude progress payments on items 
for which price and quantity data are processed. The remaining disbursements 
are assumed to be for items that are paid for at the time of delivery and repre- 
sent current-dollar purchases of unpriced items. Constant-dollar purchases are 
the value of the unpriced items deflated by the price index for priced items. 
Total purchases of weapons systems are the sum of  the priced and unpriced 
items. 
10.1.2  Measurement of Quality Change 
The technique used to construct the detailed price series is of critical impor- 
tance in the development of any measure of quality (or price) change. A tech- 
nique known as specification pricing is used to develop the price measures for 
defense purchases. This is the same technique that is used by BLS in the PPI 
and CPI. Specification pricing consists of defining the price-determining char- 
acteristics for a given item that is to be priced and pricing items with identical 
characteristics over time.  Price-determining characteristics for defense pur- 
chases are the physical characteristics of  an item that influence its price. In 
addition  to  the  physical  configuration (e.g., number  of  engines,  number 
of seats, etc.), price-determining characteristics for an aircraft would include 310  Richard C. Ziemer and Pamela A. Kelly 
(1) materials or design that affect the aircraft’s length of service, need for or 
ease of repairs,  weight,  speed, or maneuverability;  (2)  mechanical features 
that affect overall operation, efficiency, or the ability of a component to per- 
form  its  function;  and  (3)  safety  features  such  as  ejection  seats.  Price- 
determining characteristics  would not include features of style, appearance, 
comfort, convenience, or design solely to make the aircraft appear different. 
Nonphysical criteria that affect the purchase price, such as the number of units 
purchased on a given contract or the rate at which the aircraft are to be pro- 
duced, are not included as part of the specification to be priced. 
Items being purchased, however, do not usually maintain the same specifi- 
cations  for long periods  of  time. Products  are continually  being  modified, 
which can result in changes to the price-determining characteristics. When a 
change occurs in the price-determining characteristics of an item being priced, 
the change is evaluated  to determine if  it is a quality change. For defense 
purchases, the criteria for quality change are (a)  that there is a physical change 
to the item and (b)  that the change enhances the ability of the item to perform 
its mission.  Each weapons system is designed for a particular mission within 
the overall defense program. A wide variety of  missions are performed  by 
various  aircraft, from the delivery  of  nuclear  bombs  by  the B-52, to long- 
range reconnaissance  by the SR-71. Each of these missions requires an air- 
craft with somewhat different characteristics. The Navy’s F-14 fighter aircraft, 
for example, has as its mission to protect a fleet of ships from enemy aircraft. 
This requires that it be fast, be maneuverable, have sophisticated electronics 
for  detecting enemy aircraft  at great distances,  and be  able to destroy  the 
enemy aircraft before they reach the fleet. The Air Force’s A-10 attack air- 
craft, on the  other hand, has as its  mission  to supply close air support of 
ground troops. This mission requires less speed than a fighter aircraft, but the 
A-10 must be able to fly close to the ground, have some protective armor, and 
be able to destroy enemy tanks. Each physical change to an aircraft is exam- 
ined to determine if it improves that aircraft’s ability to perform its mission. If 
it does, the cost of producing that physical change is taken as the value of the 
quality change, and the price is adjusted accordingly. Any other change in the 
price paid by DOD for that item is defined as a price change. 
This procedure is known as the “performancekost-of-production”  method 
of adjusting for quality change. Changes in performance are not used to value 
the quality of an item; they are used only to determine whether there has been 
a quality change. The value of the quality change is determined by the cost of 
producing  the  change. The following  example  may  help clarify  this  tech- 
nique. Assume a fighter aircraft that flies at Mach  1 with a price of $1,000 in 
period T  In period T +  1, a physical change is made to the aircraft that al- 
lows it to fly at Mach 2.  An increase in speed helps a fighter aircraft perform 
its mission. The price of the aircraft increases to $1,500, but the cost of mak- 
ing the change was $300. These data yield a quality change of  $300 and a 
price change of $200. Therefore, there is a price increase of 20 percent and a 311  The Deflation of Military Aircraft 
quality  increase of  30  percent  even  though  the  speed of  the  aircraft has 
doubled. 
Methods of adjusting for quality change other than the performancelcost- 
of-production method have been proposed. An alternative method of adjusting 
for quality change was presented in Gordon (1990). In the case of commercial 
aircraft, Gordon adjusted prices of identical models by  a quality factor based 
on changes in net revenue relative to changes in the prices of  aircraft pur- 
chased. Gordon found that, in the period  1965-82,  net revenue rose much 
faster than price because jet technology brought about declining real costs for 
fuel, maintenance, and crew per unit of output (Gordon 1990, chap. 4). (For 
a discussion of the concepts of quality adjustment, see Triplett [  19831). 
The procedures described above may yield somewhat different measures of 
price change than price indexes such as the CPI and PPI (U.S. Department of 
Labor  1988). The primary cause of  this is the treatment of  certain price- 
influencing characteristics.  Listed  below  are  four  characteristics that  are 
treated as price changes in defense purchases but not in the calculation of  the 
PPI or CPI: 
Buy size: Differences in price due to a difference in the number of  units 
Production rate: Differences in price due to changes requested by DOD in 
Learning curve: Differences in price due to differences in position on the 
Producer: Differences in price due to different producers for the same item. 
ordered on one contract. 
the production rate, such as for stretch-outs due to budget constraints. 
learning curve (see below). 
In addition, any changes to a weapons system that are for the remedy of de- 
fects are defined as not being quality changes. It is assumed that,  when a 
weapons system enters into production, it fits together and works. 
10.1.3  Splicing Price Series 
A major problem is encountered in the development of any quantity or price 
series when a product disappears and is replaced by  a new product. The new 
product will not match the specifications of  the old product; therefore, the 
price of  the new product may not be directly comparable to the price of  the 
old product. The old and new price or quantity series must be spliced together 
to form a continuous measure over time. There exist several procedures that 
can be used to handle this problem. 
The first procedure is called a direct link procedure. The price of  the new 
product is linked to the level of the price index for the old product. This pro- 
cedure assumes that the entire difference in price level between the old product 
and the new,  at the time of  the introduction of  the new product, is due to a 
difference in quality. 
The second procedure is called a direct comparison. The price of  the new 312  Richard C. Ziemer and Pamela A. Kelly 
item is directly compared to the price of the old item. This method assumes 
that there is no difference in quality between the two items and that any differ- 
ence in the price paid is a price change. 
The third procedure, and the one used for most new weapons systems, is to 
treat the new product as a quality adjustment to the old product. This is done 
by evaluating the physical differences between the old and the new products 
to determine whether there has been a quality change. If it is determined that 
there are quality differences, the cost of producing those physical changes is 
defined as the value of the changes, and the price is adjusted accordingly. Any 
other change in the price paid by DOD for the new item is a price change. 
However, when this procedure is used for introducing a new weapons system, 
the price of the new system must also be adjusted for learning-curve effects. 
The learning curve represents the reduction in labor hours required for pro- 
ducing successive units of a new weapons system of a given technology. The 
new system may be superior to the system it replaces. However, the price of 
early units of the new system will be overstated relative to the old system, 
which has already experienced significant learning. In keeping with the cost 
analysis community, BEA assumes that, by the hundredth unit of  production 
of a new fighter aircraft, additional learning is relatively minor. The price of 
the hundredth unit of  the new system is compared with the price of  the old 
system at the link point to yield the best estimate of the actual resource cost 
difference between the two systems. BLS waits to introduce a new product 
into its price index until that product has established a market share-at  which 
time most learning has already occurred. BEA treats the higher prices for the 
first ninety-nine units over the hundredth unit of  the new system as price in- 
creases relative to the old system. Each of these units is included in the price 
index as it is delivered. A more detailed discussion of learning curves and the 
technique for introducing new models is contained in appendix A. 
10.2  Case Study 
The case study uses two hypothetical aircraft to illustrate many of the data 
sources and procedures used in the preparation of  defense purchases in the 
NIPAs. The case study highlights military aircraft, but the procedures are typ- 
ical for most military equipment purchases. The case study begins with price 
derivation and continues through index creation. In the process, quality ad- 
justments, learning curves, and splicing techniques are examined. 
A new fighter aircraft, the F4.56, replaces an older fighter aircraft, the F123. 
Both aircraft include the same general component systems, but the F456 in- 
corporates quality improvements in all components except engines. For this 
example, the aircraft are produced simultaneously for two years. Table 10.1 
shows the price and quantity information for the last four contracts of the older 
aircraft, the F123. Table 10.2 shows the entire contract history for the newer 
aircraft, the F456. An addendum containing information pertaining to quality 313  The Deflation of  Military Aircraft 
Table 10.1  F123 Unit Prices by Contract ($thousands) 
Contract number 
Contract quantity (units) 
Delivery year 
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Navigation equipment (CFE) 
Navigation equipment (GFE) 
Engines (2 per aircraft) 
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change between contracts appears at the bottom of table 10.2. Notes providing 
additional information about the F456 also appear at the bottom of table 10.2. 
To facilitate the presentation of this case study, we have made some simpli- 
fying assumptions: 
1. Typically, aircraft deliveries for a given contract year begin a year or 
more after the contract year. In addition, deliveries for that contract can extend 
over more than one year. In the case study, only one contract is delivered in a 
year for each aircraft system. For example, all fifty-five F456 aircraft in con- 
tract 5 are delivered in 1981; therefore, we will refer to contract 5 as the 1981 
F456. 
2. The estimates will be shown annually; however, BEA produces quarterly 
estimates in current and constant dollars for the national income and product 
accounts. 
3. Typically, the component prices developed for the estimation of defense 
purchases evolve from different sources. To start, prices are derived from bud- 
get estimates that contain a minimum of detail. Later, detailed contractor cost 
reports become available as the contract goes into production. At the comple- 
tion of  the contract, a final contractor cost report shows the final costs. As 
shown, the F123 and F456 prices represent estimates based on final contractor 
cost information, The data used for quality adjustment come from engineering 
change orders, which are DOD-approved engineering changes in the design 
or production of the weapon system. 
4. The F123 contract history includes information for contracts 8-1  1. We 
excluded a substantial portion of  the history for this aircraft; however, this Table 10.2  F456 Unit Prices by  Contract ($thousands) 
Contract number 
Contract quantity (units) 
Delivery year 
Contractor-furnished equipment (CFE)  12,932.9 
Airframe  8,321.5 
Flight controls  652.4 
Penetration aids  43.2 
Communications equipment  86.8 
Radar equipment  2,880.9 
Fire control equipment  436. I 
Weapons and armament systems  512.0 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
10  30  40  40  55  55  55  60  60  60  60  65 









6,390.8  5,528.7 
3,965.3  3,407.7 
521.2  494.3 
31.8  25.4 
35.6  23.1 
932.1  677.0 
298.5  268.3 

















7,210.8  10,995.6  9,366.4 
4,306.9  5,733.2  5,204.6 
725.2  764.3  815.1 
27.2  27.1  27.3 
28.0  29.6  30.1 
1,102.3  3,113.0  2,096.6 
329.4  585.2  457.0 
691.8  743.1  735.8 
9,418.3  10,184.3 10,402.6 
5,507.5  5,775.2  5,889.0 
840.4  873.2  897.8 
28.0  28.1  28.9 
31.4  33.7  38.0 
1,771.7  1,802.3  1,844.1 
485.5  894.7  903.1 
753.9  777.1  801.8 
Navigation equipment  569.1  376.6  312.3  249.8  257.1  279.0  302.2  534.6  458.5  469.9  474.6  500.2 
Navigation equipment (CFE)  523.8  349.2  289.9  230.4  2.1  2.2  2.8  10.8  3.2  3.3  3.7  3.9 
Navigation equipment (GFE)  45.3  27.4  22.4  19.4  255.0  276.8  299.4  523.8  455.3  466.6  470.9  496.3 
Government-furnished equipment (GFE)  3,675.0  3,554.8  3,723.3 3,835.2  4,949.0  5,103.9  5,690.7  6,793.6  6,900.3  8,004.1  7,694.8  8,172.0 
Engines (2 per aircraft)  1,640.6  1,705.4  1,925.2  2,125.7  3,059.8  3,353.2  3,532.8  3,692.4  3,806.4  4,658.9  4,702.8  4,911.6 
Other GFE  2,034.3  1,849.4  1,798.1  1,709.5  1,889.2  1,750.7  2,157.9  3,101.2  3,093.9  3,345.2  2,992.0  3,260.4 
Total  17,176.9  11,749.0 10,426.4 9,613.6  11,320.9  12,207.0 13,203.8 18,323.7  16,725.2  17,892.3  18,353.6  19,074.9 
Addendum: Quality issues: contract 3 = fire control software update, price declines; contract 5  = engine upgrade; contract 10 = engine upgrade; contract 5  = CFE 
navigation equipment to GFE; contract 6 = radar enhancement to offset advances in enemy missile technology; contract 6 = GFE mix of equipment changes, less 
quality; contract 7 = GFE mix of equipment changes, more quality; contract 8  = model B introduced; contract 9 = correction of  minor deficiency in flight controls; 
contract I1 = GFE fire control to CFE. 
Nore: contract 1 = existing engine used for new aircraft; contract 3 = buy size fcw  engines falls as older system disappears; contract 4 = bottom of learning curve (no 
learning for weapons systems); contract 9 = bottom of learning curve for new model except radar (10). 315  The Deflation of Military Aircraft 
was done so as to highlight the F456 and to avoid duplication of  examples. 
For the same reasons, we have made the unlikely assumption that no quality 
adjustments were needed for the F123. 
Because of  the nature of this case study, many of the complexities of  the 
work to develop current- and constant-dollar defense purchases are obscured. 
The estimates are required long before good information becomes available. 
For example, learning curves must be determined with the first production 
contract, and the percentage changes in the level of quality for a product must 
be estimated before prices can be calculated. 
10.2.1  Price Derivation 
BEA  uses  many  different data sources for price derivation,  but the best 
source is the contractor cost report. An example of this type of  report for the 
fifth F456 contract appears in figure  10.1. The report shows recurring and 
nonrecurring costs by element code, or system component, as of the date on 
the report. Estimates of these costs at the completion of the contract are also 
displayed. Additional sections provide information on the type or terms of the 
contract (sec. 5, Contract Type), the total value of the contract (sec. 6, Con- 
tract Price), and any cost-sharing arrangements that prove applicable (sec. 7, 
Contract Ceiling). Many editions of these reports exist for a single contract 
because of reporting requirements; however, the report where the “To Date” 
section equals the “At Completion” section, such as found in this example, is 
the final source of price information available to BEA. 
The report indicates that the total of  nonrecurring and recurring costs for 
the fifty-five F456 airframes (element code Al) is $246.8 million. When de- 
veloping a time series for a chosen pricing component, BEA must attempt to 
maintain the composition of that item over time. As such, the costs described 
as nonrecurring,  by definition, must be excluded from the price-estimating 
procedure. Given recurring costs of $181.4 million and a contract quantity of 
fifty-five airframes, the per-unit  cost of  the airframe is $3.299  million. To 
obtain the per-unit price, BEA multiplies the per-unit cost by a profit (or loss) 
factor that allocates a proportional value of total profit and general and admin- 
istrative (G&A) costs to the individual components. 
Generally, the profit factor equals the total contract price  divided by  the 
total manufacturing cost. For a firm-fixed-price contract as shown in the ex- 
ample, no adjustments need to be made to this formula. As a result, the profit 
factor for this contract is 1.120393, or 570,000/508,750. The estimated price 
for the  airframe  is  $3.696 million,  or  $3.299  million  X  1.120393.  Cost- 
sharing agreements typical of many types of contracts complicate this proce- 
dure because of the additional elements of target and ceiling prices. Whatever 
the procedure, the final goal is to obtain the actual value of contractor profit 
given the negotiated terms of the contract. 
The detail at which BEA derives prices often depends solely on the amount 
of  data provided in the contractor reports. Most of the prices derived for the COST  DATA  REPORT 
Dollars in  000's 
1.  Program 
Buy 5 -  f456 
-  -  3.  Contractor 
1-1  ROTBE  1-1  Procurement 
ABC  Aerospace,  IN. 
System A  /I  Weapons  System  Delivery  6  IF 
Armament 
4.  Report  as of 
31  Dec  1982 
SYSTEMS  TEST  1 EVALUATION 
SYSTEM  PROJECT  MANAGEMENT 
Engineering Management 
SuppOrt  Project Management 
Other  System Project Management 






OTHER  PROGRAM  SUPPORT 
TOTAL  MANUFACTURING  COST 
General  8  Adninirtrative 
TOTAL  COST 
Profit 
TOTAL  PRICE 
5.  Contract  Type 
FFP 
6.  Contract  Price 
570000  N/A  I 
To  Date 
Costs  Incurred 
.  Contract  Ceiling 
Non- 
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F456 were calculated at the second level of  element code detail (Al, A2), 
which is the lowest level of information shown for most elements. Although 
more detail exists for fire control and navigation equipment, inconsistencies 
between the reports for different contract years create difficulties. 
For example, early contract years for the F456 display the cost information 
in the same format as shown in figure  10.1. Later years show fire control 
equipment without the added breakdown. If we had priced fire control equip- 
ment  in  two  sections (software and  other),  then  an adjustment would  be 
needed when the detailed information is no longer available. We can avoid the 
need for an adjustment without losing much accuracy by  pricing these com- 
ponents at a higher level of detail. 
Another situation involves the weapons delivery and armament elements. 
Table 10.2 shows a price for the combination of these two components. The 
F456 reports (fig. 10.1) show them as separate items; however, the F123 re- 
ports exhibit them as a single element without additional detail. Because of 
this, we have chosen to combine the F456 elements to resemble the compo- 
nent classifications used for the F123 more closely. A more consistent time 
series for the weapons/armament component results. The prices displayed in 
table 10.2  represent the data included under the Air Vehicle element code. 
As seen in tables 10.1 and 10.2, the navigation equipment components pro- 
cured  under  both  contractor-furnished equipment  (CFE)  and  government- 
furnished equipment (GFE) are combined to make a single pricing series. In 
1981, the majority of the CFE navigation equipment switched to GFE  navi- 
gation equipment; however, the total composition of  navigation equipment 
remains the same. Owing to the method by which BEA processes quality ad- 
justments,  switches between priced series can cause some calculation prob- 
lems. To avoid these problems, we combine these two very similar series and 
process at the total navigation equipment level. A detailed discussion of price 
series switches appears later in this paper. 
Problems arise when attempting to develop consistent price series for the 
remaining elements,  such as project management or technical publications. 
No quantities are associated with these elements, thus making it difficult to 
develop per-unit prices. The contract quantity for the air vehicle could be used 
as a proxy quantity; however, the composition of these elements changes, so 
any series developed in this manner would be inconsistent over time. For ex- 
ample, both the 1981 and the 1982 F456 contracts have air vehicle quantities 
of fifty-five; however, more than fifty-five technical publications were bought 
in the 1982 contract. Using air vehicles as a proxy quantity in this case causes 
an apparent price increase for technical publications when in fact the price 
might be stable. Also, because the share of these items to the total value of the 
contract varies over time, we cannot allocate them over the Air Vehicle ele- 
ments. 
As mentioned earlier, current dollars equal the sum of the products of prices 
and quantities delivered in a given time period. Constant dollars equal the sum 318  Richard C. Ziemer and Pamela A. Kelly 
of  the products of  the quantities delivered in the given time period and the 
corresponding base prices. Any adjustments needed for differences in quality 
over time for a given product are made in the base price. As a result, constant 
dollars reflect purchases of a varying mix of consistent product series. 
Although BEA maintains price and quantity estimates for a large number 
of defense purchases, insufficient data on prices, quantities, or both require us 
to use an alternative approach when developing current and constant dollars 
for some items. The unpriced items such as data and project management, as 
well as the costs classified as nonrecurring, must be included in current- and 
constant-dollar defense purchases. As mentioned earlier, data are available for 
disbursements by class of aircraft. Progress payments, however, are not avail- 
able. The method by  which estimated progress payments are removed from 
disbursements is referred to as the “ratio method .” 
The “ratio method” uses disbursements data from financial reports to ap- 
proximate purchases, in any given time period, for those items not specifically 
priced. For example, an aircraft contract represents purchases of $1,000 over 
a five-year period. Of the $1,000, only $750 appears in the data base of priced 
items. The remaining $250 is spread over the five years of  the program by 
assigning 25 percent of all disbursements to current dollars in the time period 
when the disbursement is made. If  disbursements in the first year are $200, 
the current-dollar unpriced items are $50  ($200  X  .25). To  calculate pur- 
chases, the $50 is then added to any current dollars that result from deliveries 
of  aircraft in that year. This procedure assures that all appropriate DOD ex- 
penditures appear as defense purchases. To obtain constant dollars, the current 
dollars for unpriced items are deflated using  the  priced  items as  a proxy. 
Constant-dollar purchases then equal the sum of  constant dollars for priced 
and unpriced items. 
10.2.2  Price Series Splicing 
A common problem in developing current- and constant-dollar defense pur- 
chases occurs with the introduction of new products. The case study example 
illustrates this problem with the F123 that ends in  1978 and the F456 that 
begins in 1977. A common method used to deal with this problem is to treat 
the new product as a quality adjustment to the old product. An evaluation of 
the physical differences between the old and the new  systems in  this case 
shows that quality improved for all components except engines. (The previ- 
ously upgraded engines for the F123 are used without modification for the 
first four contracts of the F456.) 
The procedure to calculate the quality adjustment for the new  product is 
similar to the method used to calculate the value of quality change for a model 
change in a single system. Prices at comparable levels of production efficiency 
for both systems are estimated in prices of a single time period. The technique 
for choosing a comparison time period varies with the circumstances of  the 
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In the case study example, both the F123 and the F456 were produced in 
1977. We need to estimate the value of quality change in 1977 dollars, so it is 
logical to choose  1977 as the comparison time period. This eliminates the 
need to adjust the calculated value of quality change to dollars of another time 
period and, therefore, reduces the amount of the estimation error in the cal- 
culations. 
Although prices already exist for the F456 in 1977 dollars, they reflect costs 
at the top of the learning curve and represent an inefficient level of production. 
If the actual 1977 F456 prices are used in the quality-adjustment calculations, 
the value of quality change between the two aircraft would be grossly over- 
stated. To eliminate this problem, prices at the bottom of the learning curve 
for the new  system are chosen-1980  F456-as  the starting point for the 
estimation procedure. These prices represent the point where labor efficiency 
in the new system is comparable to that in the old system. Once the new 1977 
prices for the 1980 F456 have been estimated by removing a value for price 
change between these two time periods, they can be directly compared with 
the prices for the F123. The difference between the adjusted F456 prices and 
the F123 prices equals the value of quality change for the new system in 1977 
dollars. 
For example, the price of the F123 airframe in  1977 (contract 10 in table 
10.1) is 1,652.8. The price of the F456 airframe at the bottom of the learning 
curve is 3,407.7 (contract 4 in table 10.2). Estimating and removing price 
change between 1977 and  1980 gives a price for the F456 airframe in  1977 
dollars. The value of the price change must be based on a relevant price series 
that reflects a pure price change. The BEA has a limited choice of proxies for 
this purpose. The price series for another aircraft can provide a good source 
of price change if production of the other aircraft remains steady in the rele- 
vant time period. If such a source is unavailable, then we have to use a general 
price index for aircraft or aircraft components to estimate price change. For 
the purposes of this case study, a historical DOD procurement index series 
was used to estimate price change between contracts. In this case, the value 
of  price change between  1977 and  1980 for the airframe is 888.7, and the 
resulting price estimate for the airframe in 1977 dollars is 2,519.0. Taking the 
difference between the prices for the two systems gives a quality adjustment 
of 866.2 (2,519.0 - 1,652.8) in 1977 dollars. 
Often, the time period chosen for the splice represents the time when the 
decision was made to proceed with the procurement of the new product. This 
is generally the case when the two products do not have an actual overlap time 
period. For example, the government decides to procure the F456 in 1976 and 
deliveries start in 1977. If we assume that the F123 was last delivered in 1975, 
then we would estimate the F123 in 1976 prices and compare it with the esti- 
mates for an efficiently produced F456 in 1976 prices. The resulting values of 
quality change must then be adjusted to reflect prices comparable to the first 
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As the table 10.2 notes to contract 4 mention, the 1980 F456 represents the 
bottom of  the learning curve for all components except the weapons and ar- 
mament systems, which have no apparent learning curve. Because there is no 
need to adjust the  1977 F456 price for weapons and armament systems in 
order to derive a comparable level of production efficiency with the F123, the 
two systems can be linked without adjustments. The price of the F456 weap- 
ons and armament systems is 512.0 in  1977, and the price for similar F123 
systems is 322.0 in 1977. If we assume that the entire difference in price is 
due to quality improvement, then the value of  the quality change is  190.0 
(512.0 - 322.0). Table 10.3 displays the quality adjustments by component 
for the entire F456 program. 
A splicing technique must also be used when data sources for a single sys- 
tem change to the extent that the component prices no longer represent the 
same items. For example, contractor data exist for a substantial portion of a 
program, but budget documents provide the only available information for 
current and future contracts. The contractor information details cost data by 
component. The budget documents provide a single price for the combination 
of  airframe and  all  other  contractor-furnished equipment. Obviously,  the 
contractor-furnished airframe price and the budget document airframe price 
represent different levels of detail and cannot be used in the same price series 
without adjustments. 
One way in which we can handle this situation is to make a quality adjust- 
ment to the existing series. For example, on the basis of  the last available 
contractor information, the price of  the airframe could be  quality adjusted 
using the sum of the prices of the other components as the value of the quality 
improvement. This estimate could then be used with the price derived from 
the budget documents. This procedure may sound acceptable, but it has many 
problems in practical application. For example, the budget documents include 
not only the same components extracted from contractor reports but also an 
unspecified and variable mix of other items. An estimate could be developed 
to account for this problem; however, the value developed for the quality ad- 
justment in such a case becomes very judgmental. 
The preferred way in which to handle the problems associated with chang- 
ing data sources is to develop an alternative price series composed strictly of 
budget data. This series would then be used to move the primary pricing com- 
ponents, which are derived from contractor reports, in the relevant time peri- 
ods. For those time periods in  which the contractor data are available, the 
budget data series remains inactive and does not influence the derivation of 
current- and constant-dollar defense purchases. This procedure holds an ad- 
vantage because it requires no arbitrary decisions about the composition of the 
budget aggregation. 
10.2.3  Quality Valuation 
Once component prices have been established for the systems and the two 
weapons systems have been  spliced, the next major step in constructing a Table 10.3  Value of Quality Adjustments for the F456 ($thousands) 
Contract number 
Contract quantity (units) 
Delivery year 






Fire control equipment 
Weapons and armament systems 
Navigation equipment (CFE) 
Navigation equipment (GFE) 
Engines (2 per aircraft) 
Other GFE 
Navigation equipment 
Government-furnished  equipment (GFE) 
Total 
1  2  3  4 
10  30  40  40 
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55  55  60  60  60 
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11  12 
60  65 
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-300.0  319.0  736.1  - 
400.0 
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current- and constant-dollar series is the valuation of quality change within a 
particular system. For simplicity, we assume that the quality for each of the 
components of the F123 remains the same for the four contracts shown. We 
can then concentrate on the quality adjustments needed for the F456. 
The first quality issue listed in the addendum to table 10.2 appears in  1979 
(contract 3) when the contractor updates the fire control software. In the F456 
program, the fire control software update incorporates new processing tech- 
nology that increases the speed of  calculations. The important point in  this 
case is that the price of  the improved software is less than the price of  the 
original software-335.5  in 1978 and 298.5 in  1979. Given the performance/ 
cost-of-production method of  adjusting for quality change and the rule that 
the cost of producing the physical change is the value of the quality improve- 
ment, we would not make any adjustments for the software update (see sec. 
10.1.2 above). 
The next quality issue appears in  1981 (contract 5) when the government 
purchases upgraded engines. The new  engines increase the performance of 
the aircraft and, therefore, qualify as a quality adjustment. The value of the 
quality change equals the difference in prices between 1980 and 1981 less an 
adjustment for  price  change.  In  the  example,  quality  change  is  710.5 
(3,059.8 -  2,125.7 -  223.6), where 223.6 is the estimate of price change 
based on a relevant price indicator series. The engine upgrade shown in  1986 
(contract 10) is processed in the same manner. 
The 1981 contract also includes another type of  quality adjustment. In the 
example, contractor-furnished equipment and  government-furnished equip- 
ment both include purchases of navigation equipment. In this contract year, 
the majority of  the navigation equipment formerly procured from the prime 
contractor switched from CFE to GFE. The price for this equipment in  1981 
is 235; therefore, the value of quality change for CFE navigation equipment is 
-  235, and the value of quality change for GFE navigation equipment is 235. 
As mentioned earlier, switches such as this can cause problems in later calcu- 
lations. In this case study, these two subcomponents never influence the final 
results. All  processing is done at the level of  total navigation equipment, 
where the quality-adjustment  effect is zero. 
The next quality adjustment occurs in  1982 (contract 6)  when the radar is 
improved to offset advances in enemy missile technology. This quality adjust- 
ment is similar to the engine upgrade mentioned before. In this case, the value 
of the quality change is 235.1 (1,048.5 - 749.3 - 64. l), where 64.1 is the 
estimate of price change between 1981 and 1982. 
The contracts for 1982 and  1983 (contracts 6 and  7) show the effects of 
changes in the mix of  equipment for other GFE. For simplicity in this case 
study, we assume that the other GFE component contains a consistent mix of 
equipment in most contracts. Typically, the other GFE components of an air- 
craft system can vary substantially from one contract to the next. In these two 
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1983. The value of  the repair kits not purchased in  1982 is 300, so the value 
of  the quality adjustment for this component is  -300.  In  1983, we assume 
that the price of repair kits has increased by the same amount as the remaining 
components within other GFE; therefore, the value of  the repair kits pur- 
chased and, thus, the quality adjustment is 319.0. 
A model change usually requires some additional considerations when cal- 
culating the value of quality adjustment. In many instances, the price series 
will exhibit learning-curve characteristics, and additional steps must be taken 
so as not to overstate the value of the quality adjustment. 
In 1984 (contract 8), deliveries for the new B model of the F456 begin. The 
data show evidence of  a learning curve for some components of  the new 
model, including the airframe, radar equipment, fire control equipment, nav- 
igation equipment, and other GFE. Quality improves for flight controls, but 
no  learning curve is evident. The remaining components (penetration aids, 
communications equipment, weapons, and engines) do not  have  significant 
quality changes. In the example, the bottom of the learning curve for the new 
model is reached in  1985 for all components except radar equipment. The 
bottom of the learning curve for the radar equipment appears in 1986. 
To  calculate the correct value of  the quality adjustment, we estimate the 
price of  the A model in  1984 prices. Then we  estimate the price of  the B 
model at the bottom of the learning curve (1985 for all items except radar) in 
1984 prices. The difference between the estimated prices for the B model and 
the estimated prices for the A model equals the value of quality adjustment for 
the new model. 
For example, we estimate the price of the airframe for the A model in 1984 
dollars as 4,507.2 (4,306.9  X  1.0465), where 1.0465 is the factor used to 
adjust for price change between 1983 and 1984. As mentioned earlier, for the 
case study, the value or factor used to adjust for price change between two 
time periods comes from a DOD procurement price indicator series. The price 
of the B model in 1984 dollars, derived from prices at the bottom of the learn- 
ing curve, is 5,037.4 (5,204.6/1.0332), where 1.0332 is the factor used to 
adjust for price change between 1984 and 1985. The value of the quality ad- 
justment for the new model airframe equals the difference between 5,037.4 
and 4,507.2, or 530.2. The same procedure is used for all components; how- 
ever, for radar equipment, the factor accounts for price change between 1984 
and 1986. Also, because flight controls do not have a learning curve, no ad- 
justment was  necessary. The calculation of  the quality adjustment for this 
component is identical to that for the engine upgrades explained earlier. 
The next quality issue appears in  1985 (contract 9). A minor problem was 
discovered in the flight controls for the new B model. An engineering change 
order was instituted to correct the production deficiency responsible for the 
flaw in the flight controls, and the cost of the correction is $7,000 per aircraft. 
Although such a case, by  its very nature, indicates a quality improvement, 
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In other words,  the cost of the correction of  a deficiency  on a production 
aircraft will appear as a price change. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that, 
when a system starts into production, it fits together and works. 
The last quality-adjustment issue mentioned in the notes to table 10.2 con- 
cerns a GFE-CFE switch in 1987 (contract  11). Some fire control equipment 
previously  included  in the other GFE component is now being purchased as 
CFE. This case shows the opposite of the situation explained earlier for navi- 
gation equipment, but, in this situation, the two pricing series remain sepa- 
rate. On the basis of contractor cost information, the price of  the fire control 
equipment is 400.0. Thus, the value of quality improvement  for CFE radar 
equipment is 400. 
Previously, we alluded to calculation problems when making quality adjust- 
ments for switches between pricing series. Assuming no other quality adjust- 
ments, the net effect on the total quality  for the aircraft after a price series 
switch should be zero. In order to achieve this result, the quality adjustment 
for one series must equal a value that will offset the constant-dollar  implica- 
tions of the quality adjustment in the other series. The technique by which this 
is done involves some concepts not yet discussed in this case study; therefore, 
at this time, we will say only that the value of the quality adjustment for other 
GFE is -  444.9. Appendix B discusses the problems of switches and quality 
valuation in detail. 
10.2.4  Quality Factors 
To  account for quality adjustment in  constant-dollar  defense  purchases, 
BEA adjusts the base price of a series to reflect the change in quality. Each 
current price reflects  a certain level of quality in the product  series, so we 
derive a quality-adjusted base price for every current price. The technique by 
which this is done involves the derivation of  quality factors and cumulative 
quality factors. Quality factors are a way of expressing the value of quality 
change as a percentage change. Cumulative quality factors allow us to com- 
pare levels of quality over a sequence of contracts. Each current or contract 
price in a price series has a quality factor and a cumulative quality factor. 
For example, a product originally  costs $500 and a quality improvement 
occurs that is valued  at $50. Quality improves by  10 percent; therefore, the 
quality factor is  I. 100. Subsequently, the price of the product rises to $700, 
and another quality adjustment occurs that is valued at $35. This new quality 
adjustment is a 5 percent improvement over the already  improved product, 
and the quality factor is 1.050. The two values of quality improvement are not 
comparable, given the price changes, and cannot be added; however,  using 
quality factors, the difference in the levels of quality between the first and the 
latest observations can be expressed as another percentage change. This cu- 
mulative quality factor for the newest version of the product equals the prod- 
uct of the quality factors, or 1.155 (1.100  X  1.050). 
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non-quality-adjusted  price. In practice, we use two variations of  this equation 
to derive quality factors. The method used depends on the situation and the 
assumptions made about the price and quality values available for use in the 
equation. The two methods are shown below (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1975, 65). Equation (5)  shows method  1, the adjusted  current price  link 
method, and equation (6) shows method 2, the back link method: 
where F  = quality factor,  V  = value  of  quality  change,  P  = price,  and 
s = contract sequence. 
Although the  above equations can be  expressed in  notations  indicating 
time, quality factors really  represent  changes in quality over a sequence of 
contracts or purchases. Often, this loosely corresponds to time; however, that 
is not always the case. Because contracts may overlap in a real time series, 
the boundaries of  time with regard  to quality  are not clear.  Also, a quality 
factor may represent the change in quality between two different systems in 
the same time period. In that case, s represents  the new system and s - 1 
represents the previous or older system. For example, to splice the F456 to 
the F123, we develop a quality adjustment in  1977 based on prices for each 
system in 1977. 
The adjusted current price link method, which is the most commonly used 
technique, uses the current product price as the quality-adjusted price in the 
numerator. The denominator is an estimate of the non-quality-adjusted  price, 
which is derived by subtracting the value of quality change from the current 
price. This equation generates a legitimate quality factor only when the price 
and quality values are expressed in terms of the same level of production effi- 
ciency. 
The back link method uses product prices from the previous contract in the 
equation. The quality-adjusted price in the numerator is the price of the pre- 
vious contract plus the value of  the quality adjustment between the two con- 
tracts in question. The denominator is the price of the previous contract. The 
implications of this technique require that the price and quality values used in 
the equation are expressed in terms of the same price level as well as the same 
level of production efficiency. 
For example, if P,- I  and Q,  are expressed in dollars of different time pe- 
riods, then a quality adjustment based on the sum of  these two values (Ps-l 
and V,) ignores any price change evident between the two time periods repre- 
sented by the contracts s - 1 and s. If Ps-l is $100, P,  is $200, and V, is 
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(100 + 90)/100. Prices between contract s - 1 and contract s increase 10 
percent, so s - 1 and s  dollars are not equivalent. But, by using the back link 
method to calculate the quality factor, an assumption of equivalence is made. 
As a result, the quality factor in this example would be overstated. 
We generally use the back link method when the value of the quality change 
and the two prices are all expressed in comparable dollars but the levels of 
production efficiency differ. This is the case when splicing two price series or 
when changing models. The value of quality change incorporated in the new 
product is based on an estimate of an efficiently produced item in that time 
period. In other words, the price is adjusted for the learning curve before the 
quality calculation is done. During the procedure, a price for the older product 
is also generated for that time period if  a price does not already exist. The 
back link method allows us to estimate a meaningful value in the numerator, 
namely, the price of the previous product if a quality adjustment had occurred. 
For example, the 1977 F123 airframe price of  1,652.8 plus the value of qual- 
ity change of 866.2 for the  1977 F456 airframe is a realistic estimate of  a 
quality-improved airframe in 1977 dollars. 
On the other hand, in a case where the learning curve is a factor, the ad- 
justed current price link method generates a meaningless denominator because 
the price and quality values represent different levels of production efficiency. 
For example, in 1977, the price of the F456 airframe is 8,321.5, and the value 
of  the quality change is again 866.2. Using the adjusted current price link 
method, the quality factor is 1.1  16, or 8,321.5/(8,321.5 - 866.2). The qual- 
ity factor is meaningless because the denominator has no economic meaning. 
The price of 8,321.5 is abnormally high because of the learning-curve consid- 
erations, but the quality change value of  866.2 already includes adjustments 
to remove the learning-curve effect. Therefore, using this method to calculate 
the quality factor understates the value of quality change. It should be noted 
that, if a price that had been adjusted for the learning curve were used in place 
of 8,321.5, then this equation would generate a legitimate quality factor equal 
to that generated by the back link method. 
Given comparable prices and quality values, either the back link or the ad- 
justed current price link technique can be used to obtain the correct quality 
factor. In practice, we find it easier to calculate quality factors by  making a 
distinction between  these  two  methods.  In  the  case  study,  the  back  link 
method was used to calculate component quality factors in those time periods 
when prices are at the top of the learning curve-1977  and 1984. The adjusted 
current price link method was used in all other time periods. 
For example, for the 1977 (contract 1) F456 airframe, the price is 8,321.5, 
and the value of quality change is 866.2. The price for the previous observa- 
tion is 1,652.8, or the price of the F123 in 1977. Using the back link method, 
the  quality  factor  is  1.5241, or (1,652.8 + 866.2)/1,652.8. In  1986, the 
quality factor for the engines using the adjusted current price link method is 
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Once the quality factors have been calculated, cumulative quality factors 
for the product series must be derived. The cumulative quality factor is 1.000 
for the first observation of a pricing component, and subsequent cumulative 
quality factors accumulate multiplicatively from this point. The choice of the 
base year has no relevance in the equation. As in equations (5)  and (6), the 
cumulative quality factor is derived  for each product  series by contract  se- 
quence: 
(7) 
where M  = cumulative quality factor,  F  = component quality  factor,  and 
s = contract sequence. 
In the case example, as mentioned earlier, we are assuming that quality is 
unchanged for the F123. As a result of this assumption, the quality factors for 
each of the F123 components for contracts 8-1  1 must equal 1.000. The cu- 
mulative quality factors for these contracts also equal 1  .000. 
Cumulative quality factors change when the new system is introduced. For 
the 1977 F456 airframe, the quality factor is 1.5241. When multiplied by the 
cumulative quality factor for the previous  contract  (1  .OOO),  the cumulative 
quality factor for the airframe in 1977 is also 1.5241. The next available air- 
frame quality adjustment occurs in 1984 when the B model is introduced. The 
quality  factor for the 1984 airframe is 1.1176, and, when multiplied by the 
cumulative quality factor for 1983, the cumulative quality factor for 1984 is 
1.7034, or (1.5241  X  1.1176). In other words, the quality of the B model of 
the F456 is 70.3 percent greater than that of the F123. 
Tables  10.4 and 10.5 show the component quality factors and cumulative 
quality factors for each contract. 
10.2.5  Base Price Derivation 
Cumulative quality factors  allow us to calculate  base prices for any base 
year with little difficulty. We do this by calculating what we call a non-quality- 
adjusted base price for each component series for the base year in question. 
The non-quality-adjusted  base price equals the base period current dollars di- 
vided by the product of the base period quantity and base period cumulative 
quality factor. In other words, for a given base year, the non-quality-adjusted 
base price is the base price for the first observation of a component series. 
where N  = non-quality-adjusted  base price, M  = cumulative quality factor, 
P = price, and b  = base period. 
This simple equation illustrates  the procedure when only one contract  is 
delivered in the base year. If different contract values exist in the base period, 
then each of the contract quantities must be multiplied by its respective price 
in the numerator and its cumulative quality factor in the denominator. Table 10.4  F456 Quality Factors by Contract 
Contract number 
Contract quantity (units) 
Delivery year 
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1 .m Table 10.5  F456 Cumulative Quality Factors by Contract 
Contract number  1  2  3  4  5 
Contract quantity (units)  10  30  40  40  55 
Delivery year  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
Contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) 
Airframe  1.5241  1.5241  1.5241  1.5241  1.5241 
Flight controls  1.4808  1.4808  1.4808  1.4808  1.4808 
Penetration aids  1.4681  1.4681  1.4681  1.4681  1.4681 
Communications equipment  1.4186  1.4186  1.4186  1.4186  1.4186 
Radar equipment  1.4148  1.4148  1.4148  1.4148  1.4148 
Fire control equipment  1.4073  1.4073  1.4073  1.4073  1.4073 
Weapons and armament systems  1.5899  1.5899  1.5899  1.5899  1.5899 
Navigation equipment  1.3838  1.3838  1.3838  1.3838  1.3838 
Navigation equipment (GFE)  1.4368  1.4368  1.4368  1.4368  18.3197 
Navigation equipment (CFE)  1.3795  1.3795  1.3795  1.3795  0.0122 
Government-furnished equipment (GFE) 
Engines (2 per aircraft)  1.oooO  1.M)o  1.M)o  1.oooO  1.3025 
Other GFE  1.4885  1.4885  1.4885  1.4885  1.4885 
6  7  8 
55  55  60 
1982  1983  1984 
1.5241  1.5241  1.7034 
1.4808  1.4808  1.5151 
1.4681  1.4681  1.4681 
1.4186  1.4186  1.4186 
1.8238  1.8238  2.6321 
1.4073  1.4073  1.8056 
1.5899  1.5899  1.5899 
1.3838  1.3838  1.9415 
0.0122  0.0122  0.0130 
18.3197  18.3197  25.7612 
1.3025  1.3025  1.3025 
1.2708  1.4912  1.9773 
9  10  11 
60  60  60 
1985  1986  1987 
1.7034  1.7034  1.7034 
1.5151  1.5151  1.5151 
1.4681  1.4681  1.4681 
1.4186  1.4186  1.4186 
2.6321  2.6321  2.6321 
1.8056  1.8056  3.2655 
1.5899  1.5899  1.5899 
1.9415  1.9415  1.9415 
0.0130  0.0130  0.0130 
25.7612  25.7612  25.7612 
1.3025  1.5099  1.5099 
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Once the non-quality-adjusted base price has been derived, the base price 
for any individual contract within the component series can be calculated. The 
base price equals the non-quality-adjusted base price multiplied by the cumu- 
lative quality factor: 
(9)  Bs  = N  X  Ms, 
where N  = non-quality-adjusted base price, M  = cumulative quality factor, 
B = base price, and s = contract sequence. 
For  example,  the base year for consideration is  1975 = 100. The F123 
engines have a price of  1,459.7, a quantity of  70, and a cumulative quality 
factor of  1  .OOO  in the base year. Using equation 8, the non-quality-adjusted 
base price for engines is 1,459.7, or (1,459.7  X  70)/(70  X  1  .OW). 
The cumulative quality factor for engines changes for the 1981 contract of 
the F456. Using equation (9), the base price for the 1981 engines is 1,901.2, 
or (1,459.7  X  1.3025). 
Table 10.6 displays the 1975 = 100 base prices for each of the component 
contract values.  Table  10.7 displays the  resulting price indexes using  the 
price, quantity, and base price information. Table  10.8 shows purchases  in 
constant 1975 prices. 
10.3  Conclusions 
This case study has examined many issues and procedures common to the 
work  done  at the Bureau of  Economic Analysis for the  derivation  of  the 
constant-dollar defense  purchases  series for  military  equipment.  Aircraft, 
which is the largest of the durable goods aggregations, accounted for 8.7 per- 
cent of  defense purchases in  1982. Since 1982, the portion of  defense pur- 
chases attributable to aircraft has fluctuated between 8.3 and  11.9 percent. 
Since the 1987 high of  11.9 percent of defense purchases, aircraft’s share of 
the total has gradually declined to 10.5 percent in  1989. The aircraft series 
detailed in this case study is typical of most of the major equipment purchases 
included in defense current and constant dollars. Some additional observa- 
tions might prove useful. 
10.3.1  Highlights 
The base year presented in the case study is  1975. During that time, the 
F123 is a mature program with efficient production quantities, and the F456 
has not yet appeared. Base prices represent prices at efficient production lev- 
els. Consider another base year. In  1984, the deliveries of a new model F456 
begin, and, as explained earlier, many of the components such as the airframe 
and radar equipment have learning curves. As  a result, a time series using 
1984 base prices would reflect inefficient production levels for many of  the 
components. Given multiple aircraft series in a 1984 = 100 base, the case 
study aircraft will have a relatively higher importance solely because of  the 





Contract quantity (units) 
Delivery year 






Fire control equipment 
Weapons and armament systems 
Navigation equipment (CFE) 
Navigation equipment (GFE) 
Engines (2 per aircraft) 
Other GFE 
Navigation equipment 
Government-furnished equipment (GFE) 
Total 
12 
10  30  40  40  55  55  55  60  60  60  60  65 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
3,325.3  3,325.3  3,325.3  3,325.3  3,325.3 3,437.0 3,437.0  3,952.9  3,952.9  3,952.9  4,116.1  4,116.1 
2,071.9  2,071.9  2,071.9  2,071.9  2,071.9 2,071.9  2,071.9  2,315.6  2,315.6 2,315.6  2,315.6  2,315.6 
288.3  288.3  288.3  288.3  288.3  288.3  288.3  295.0  295.0  295.0  295.0  295.0 
14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8  14.8 
12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6 
386.6  386.6  386.6  386.6  386.6  498.4  498.4  719.3  719.3  719.3  719.3  719.3 
157.3  157.3  157.3  157.3  157.3  157.3  157.3  201.8  201.8  201.8  365.0  365.0 
393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6  393.6 









135.4  135.4  135.4  135.4  135.4  135.4  135.4  190.0  190.0  190.0  190.0  190.0  97.9 
2,408.8 2,408.8  2,408.8  2,408.8  2,850.3 2,711.5  2,852.0  3,162.0  3,162.0  3,464.8  3,301.6  3,301.6  2,097.3 
1,459.7  1,459.7  1,459.7 1,459.7  1,901.2 1,901.2  1,901.2  1,901.2  1,901.2  2,204.0  2,204.0  2,204.0  1,459.7 
949.1  949.1  949.1  949.1  949.1  810.2  950.8  1,260.7  1,260.7  1,260.7  1,097.5  1,097.5  637.6 
5,869.5  5,869.5 5,869.5 5,869.5  6,311.0 6,283.9 6,424.5  7,304.8  7,304.8 7,607.6  7.607.6  7.607.6  4.400.9 Table 10.7  Implicit Price Deflators (CY 1975 = 100) 
Delivery Year 









Fire control equipment 









Engines (2 per aircraft) 
Other GFE 
Total 
100.000  11  1.688  168.561  169.782  192.  I90  166.264  183.889  198.546  209.797  278.167  236.952  238.266  247.428  252.733 
100.000  110.797  168.882  168.908  191.387  164.476  178.405  195.837  207.872  247.592  224.763  237.843  249.402  254.318 
100.000  111.939  143.126  156.078  180.753  171.419 238.258  236.619  251.514  259.050  276.268  284.835  295.960  304.281 
1OO.OOO  116.754  153.853  170.513  214.798  171.568  177.647  181.700  183.726  183.051  184.402  189.130  189.806  195.209 
100.000  114.296  222.983  216.984  282.126  182.721  187.176  198.823  221.897  234.577  238.539  248.842  267.069  301.146 
100.000  111.939  227.142  215.235  241.072  175.105  193.794  210.362  221.156  432.766  291.457  246.291  250.551  256.362 
100.000  113.698  149.933  161.252  189.743  170.522  178.301  191.523  209.385  289.936  226.398  240.540  245.120  247.409 
100.000  114.901  130.067  138.998  154.026  160.784  165.560  173.385  175.747  188.780  186.925  191.523  197.417  203.692 
100.000  115.936  180.560  191.371  230.601  184.435  189.851  206.023  223.190  281.346  241.325  247.326  249.769  263.270 
100.000  1 11.340  123.199  131.216  154.571  159.215  173.629  188.235  199.533  214.854  218.227  231.014  233.064  247.520 
100.000  109.678  112.393  116.833  131.888  145.623  160.935  176.369  185.816  194.210  200.206  211.381  213.372  222.846 
100.000  115.144  146.593  160.1  I1  189.458  180.119  199.058  216.077  226.962  245.986  245.404  265.339  272.607  297.069 
100.000  I1  1.617  147.665  152.777  177.637  163.790  179.383  194.258  205.523  250.844  228.961  235.189  241.253  250.734 Table  10.8  Constant Dollars (CY 1975 = 100) 
Delivery Year 









Fire control equipment 









Engines (2 per aircraft) 
Other GFE 
Total 
154,404  165,432  198,685  265,190  133,010  133,010  182,889  189,037  189,037  237,172  237,172  237,172  246,963  267,544 
95,158  101,955  122,674  164,111  82,875  82,875  113,953  113,953  113,953  138,936  138,936  138,936  138,936  150,514 
13,631  14,605  17,488  23,255  11,534  11,534  15,859  15,859  15,859  17,702  17,702  17,702  17,702  19,178 
706  756  904  1,200  592  592  814  814  814  888  888  888  888  962 
623  667  793  1,046  505  505  694  694  694  757  757  757  757  820 
19,131  20,497  24,364  32,097  15,466  15,466  21,266  27,413  27,413  43,160  43,160  43,160  43,160  46,757 
7,825  8,384  9,957  13,103  6,293  6,293  8,652  8,652  8,652  12,110  12,110  12,110  21,901  23,727 
17,331  18,568  22,505  30,378  15,745  15,745  21,650  21,650  21,650  23,618  23,618  23,618  23,618  25,586 
6,850  7,340  8,694  11,402  5,417  5,417  7,448  7,448  7,448  11,400  11,400  11,400  11,400  12,350 
146,812  157,299  181,387  229,563  96,352  96,352  156,767  149,131  156,861  189,717  189,717 207,885  198,094  214,602 
102,181  109,480  124,077  153,271  58,389  58,389  104,568  104,568  104,568  114,074  114,074  132,242  132,242  143,262 
44,631  47,819  57,310  76,291  37,963  37,963  52,199  44,563  52,293  75,643  75,643  75,643  65,852  71,340 
308,066  330,071  388,765  506,155  234,779  234,779  347,104  345,616  353,346  438,290  438,290  456,458  456,458  494,496 334  Richard C. Ziemer and Pamela A. Kelly 
In both  1985 and  1986, the  actual  number  of  F456 aircraft remains  the 
same; however,  purchases  measured  in constant dollars change because the 
engine was upgraded in 1986. 
In the notes to table 10.2, the second item indicates that the buy size, or the 
contracted quantity, for the engines falls because of the discontinued produc- 
tion of the F123. This issue raises an important point that has not yet been 
addressed in the case study. Buy size does not affect the definition of a speci- 
fication. When the engine quantities fall from 210 (105 aircraft  X  2 engines 
each) in  1978 to 80 in  1979, the price for a set of engines increases from 
1,705.4 to  1,925.2. This translates to a substantial increase in the  implicit 
price deflator for engines. 
The base price derivation and quality-adjustment methods described in the 
case study offer us considerable flexibility. BEA can easily calculate defense 
purchases  on any base because much of  the preliminary  work done for the 
published series need not be repeated for another base. Given prices, quanti- 
ties, and quality  factors,  the derivation of base  prices  for any year  can be 
completely automated. 
10.3.2  Actual Data 
Table  10.9 displays  the implicit price deflators (IPD) and fixed-weighted 
price indexes for new aircraft implicit in the published defense purchases se- 
ries. Table 10.10 shows the price indexes for various aircraft from which the 
published fixed-weighted index was calculated. 
The differences between the two published series in table 10.9 indicate the 
effects of quantity shifts. For example, in 1986, the fixed index declines 7.4 
percent,  while the IPD increases 4.5 percent. Much of the difference can be 
attributed to the B-1. The B-1 price declines because of the learning curve, so 
the fixed-weighted index falls.  The B-1 quantities increase 800 percent be- 
tween  1985 and  1986. The large shift in the relative importance of  the B-1 
causes the IPD to increase.  In addition,  higher deliveries of C-5 aircraft in 
1986 also help increase the IPD; the C-5  has no effect on the fixed-weighted 
index because it was not delivered in the base year. 
The price indexes shown in table 10.10 exhibit many of the qualities high- 
lighted earlier in this paper.  For example, learning curves can be  seen  for 
many  of  these  systems.  The B-1 has  a short life in  which the  prices  drop 
dramatically as the buy sizes increase. The TR- 1 prices drop steadily for many 
years because of the relatively small quantities purchased in each contract. In 
1988, the F-14 index rises dramatically owing to deliveries of  a new model 
that is moving down a learning curve. 
Generally,  when  a learning  curve is evident,  indexes start very high  and 
drop to a level similar to the other systems in that time period. The B-1 starts 
above 300 and drops to almost  130 at the bottom of its learning curve. The 
exception  to this is when a system is high on its learning curve in the base 335  The Deflation of Military Aircraft 
Table 10.9  Implicit Price Deflator and Fixed-  Weighted Price Indexes for Defense 
Purchases (CY 1982 = 100) 
% Change  Difference 
in Change, 










































































































year. By rule, the index in the base year must be 100; therefore, these systems 
usually have very low indexes; the TR- 1 is an example. 
Changes in buy size produce interesting results in the price indexes for in- 
dividual systems. The stretch-out in the A-10 program best illustrates the ef- 
fect of buy size on prices. The price index increases 34.8 percent in  1982, 
48.2 percent in 1983, and 8.5 percent in 1984. Four contracts were delivered 
during that time period, during which quantities fell from  142 to 60 to 20 in 
each of the last two buys. Table 10.10  System-Level Price Indexes for Military Aircraft (CY 1982 = 100) 



















19.5  31.2  26.5  16.4  40.1  16.9  45.6 
20.4  32.6  28.6  17.9  46.1  18.2  54.4 
23.8  38.6  32.3  20.7  47.0  19.8  64.0 
24.8  49.6  37.5  23.7  62.4  23.5  76.0 
27.8  80.3  38.5  24.8  62.4  23.5  61.2 
31.3  74.4  46.8  29.8  64.9  28.7  62.9 
43.7  69.6  49.8  31.8  64.3  28.7  64.4 
54.0  66.6  62.2  39.4  78.2  30.5  70.5 
55.9  67.0  80.7  51.0  95.6  37.6  77.7 
65.4  74.2  91.0  103.5  98.3  63.6  85.0 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
126.7  148.2  106.5  110.4  102.4  100.2  116.4 
118.5  160.8  118.2  114.1  102.3  87.1  121.5 
0.0  0.0  125.9  119.2  104.7  59.2  136.5 
0.0  0.0  122.6  116.5  98.8  54.0  146.6 
0.0  0.0  113.1  106.3  104.2  50.7  140.6 
0.0  0.0  120.0  114.4  123.5  51.7  144.1 
0.0  0.0  120.0  114.4  128.7  54.9  140.7 
34.8  0.0 
44.3  0.0 
56.8  0.0 
64.9  0.0 
50.4  0.0 
54.2  0.0 
77.8  0.0 
102.2  0.0 
87.7  0.0 
90.9  0.0 
100.0  0.0 
108.2  360.5 
126.0  331.7 
117.0  349.7 
116.4  190.8 
105.4  133.6 
100.8  131.9 
103.9  135.8 
57.3  0.0 
57.6  0.0 
51.4  0.0 
55.6  0.0 
58.4  0.0 
58.9  0.0 
64.1  0.0 
68.3  0.0 
74.2  75.1 
87.6  101.3 
100.0  100.0 
96.6  103.1 
99.3  111.0 
104.3  107.5 
106.1  118.2 
103.6  117.3 
161.7  114.8 
159.3  116.0 
36.2  59.5  49.1  43.5  30.2  29.3 
37.5  59.4  41.8  42.5  37.3  35.1 
41.3  56.2  41.4  41.5  37.1  36.9 
49.9  51.8  42.1  47.3  35.2  37.1 
55.9  59.9  52.5  57.2  47.6  47.2 
50.9  73.5  61.4  72.9  49.7  52.9 
57.1  70.0  60.7  70.4  57.2  49.3 
69.8  87.5  65.4  70.9  65.2  51.3 
78.6  92.4  75.4  87.2  79.1  59.0 
82.0  98.9  85.0  90.6  94.3  71.0 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
81.3  103.6  100.2  108.4  125.0  126.9 
98.1  104.3  97.3  117.7  120.6  168.4 
116.9  106.3  92.7  118.3  108.7  109.2 
147.1  115.7  86.0  120.4  116.5  103.0 
136.7  118.4  91.9  121.5  114.6  95.9 
151.9  115.7  101.6  121.3  111.2  93.5 
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Appendix A 
Learning Curves 
Cost analysts have observed that, as more units of  a complex item are pro- 
duced, the labor hours required for producing successive units falls. This re- 
lation is called the organizational  learning  (or progress) curve.  The earliest 
publication  on  a  learning  curve  for aircraft  was Wright  (1936). Since that 
time, a considerable amount of research on this phenomenon has been under- 
taken by cost analysts and economists. A recent nonmathematical review of 
learning-curve research is contained in Argote and Epple (1990). 
Most common forms of the learning curve are represented by a smoothly 
decreasing function for labor hours per unit of output as the number of units 
produced increases. The simple form of the curve is the “unit” or “Boeing” 
curve, in which the learning rate is defined as the percentage that labor hours 
decline as the quantities produced double. The following example depicts a 
learning rate of 10 percent: 
Unit No.  Labor Hours 
4  100 
8  90 
16  81 
32  73 
The labor hours saved per unit decrease by  10 percent as the number of units 
produced  doubles.  Learning  curves  are  usually  expressed  in  terms  of  the 
slope, which is 100 minus the learning rate. The example above represents a 
90 percent learning curve. 
The learning curve is important in deriving the appropriate price for splic- 
ing in a new weapons  system. The splice price should represent the quality 
difference between the two systems at a comparable phase in the production 
cycle. Because of  learning, prices of initial units of the new system will be 
overstated relative to the old weapons system where significant learning has 
already taken place. Splicing with the price for the first unit would result in 
the value of the resources saved in learning being treated as additional quality 
in the new system. The initial splice price would be very high, prices would 
drop after the  splice period, and  overall price  change  for the  new  system 
would be understated. 
It is assumed that, by  the hundredth  unit of  production of a new fighter 
aircraft,  additional  learning  is relatively  minor.  Therefore,  the price of the 
hundredth unit, expressed in dollars of the time period when the first produc- 
tion contract is signed, represents the best estimate of the actual resource cost 
difference  between the two systems. Note that this estimate does not account 
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Fig. 10A.l  Splicing weapons systems with learning 
6  7  8 
Table 10A.1  Alternative Splicing for Price Indexes 
Price Per Unit  Price Indexes 
F-I1  Combined 
Time 
Period  F- I  $of T  Actual  F-l  F-I1  P1  P2  P3 




















9,000  150.0  281.3 
8,OOO  250.0 
7,000  218.8 
7,500  234.4 
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Figure 10A.  1 illustrates the procedure. Point A represents the price of the 
old system at time period 2, when the decision is made to purchase a new 
system. The curve BC represents the estimated resources needed to produce 
the new system in factor prices of time period 2. Point C is the hundredth unit 
of the new system. The difference in price of this unit, when compared to the 
old  system,  represents the  difference  in  quality between  the  two  systems 
(D -  A).  The remaining difference in the expected price of the new system 
(E - D)  is recorded as a change in price. 
A numerical example of how the learning curve is used to create an adjusted 
price and splice two series together may help clarify the procedure. Figure 
10A.2 and table  10A.  1 present data to splice the aircraft F-I1 to the aircraft 
F-I. In order to simplify the illustration, we have assumed that there are no 
quality changes to the aircraft during this period. 
The initial production contract for the F-I1 was  signed in  time period 0, 
when the F-I was being delivered at a price of  $2,500 (A on  fig. 10A.2). In 
dollars of time period 0, the F-I1 is expected to have a price of $8,500 (B)  for 
the first lot purchased and drop to $3,500 (C) for the fifth lot. These prices are 
derived by  estimating the unit resource requirements (labor, materials, etc.) 
and expressing them in terms of time period 0 dollars. These estimates repre- 
sent the expected savings in resources due to learning. Adjusting these prices 
for expected price change yields the price to be paid. 
The hundredth F-I1 will be delivered from the fourth lot at a price of $4,000 
(D)  in time period 0 dollars. When compared to the F-I price of $2,500 (A) in 
time period 0, this price yields a quality difference (or, more specifically, a 
resource cost difference) of $1,500 (D’ -  A). In short, one F-I1 is the equiv- 
alent of  1.6  F-Is in period 0 dollars. The F-I, however, has increased in price 
by  25 percent from the base period price of $2,000 (E).  Therefore, the base 
price for the F-I1 must be adjusted to maintain the ratio of  1: 1.6. This yields a 
F-I1 base price of $3,200 (F). 
Using the derived base price for the F-11,  a price index can be constructed 
for the spliced series (table IOA. 1).  The actual prices paid for the F-I1 are used 
to calculate the index; the quality link is carried in the new base price. The 
constant period 0 estimates are used only to estimate the resource-cost differ- 
ence between the two systems. This procedure yields a high splice price for 
the F-11, thereby causing the price index to jump dramatically and then decline 
(index Pl). 
P2 shows the price index that would result if the same price data were used 
for the two aircraft, but the direct link procedure was used to splice the price 
series. This assumes that the entire difference in price between the two aircraft 
is due to a difference in quality. P3 shows the price index that would result if 
the direct comparison method were used to splice the two series. This method 
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Fig. 10A.2  F-I/F-I1 splice 
Appendix B 
Analysis of Price Series Switches 
Quality factors and the level of  detail at which BEA derives prices lead to 
some problems for a few situations. Although the pricing series appear fairly 
detailed, they generally refer to a group of items. At times, BEA has sufficient 
information to subdivide these groups; however, details for many groups re- 
main vague. A problem arises when an element of one pricing group shifts to 341  The Deflation of Military Aircraft 
another pricing group. In the case study, this situation can be observed in 1981 
when  some  contractor-furnished  (CFE)  navigation  equipment  shifts  to 
government-furnished  (GFE) navigation equipment. Also, in 1987, some fire 
control equipment embedded in the other GFE series shifts to the CFE fire 
control series. Because the quality implied by the sum of  these components 
remains the same, the sum of the base prices should also remain unchanged. 
The way  in  which  we derive  quality  factors implies that  the percentage 
change in the price due to a quality adjustment translates to the same percent- 
age change in the base price.  But the relative importance of a product in the 
shift time period seldom equates to the same relative importance in constant 
prices.  As a result, in most product shift cases, the quality factor technique 
produces a discrepancy between the changes in value of the two base prices in 
question. 
For example, in  1987 some fire control equipment  previously bought  as 
GFE is now bought as CFE. Based on the contractor cost report, the value of 
this equipment equals 400. Using the adjusted current price link method, the 
quality  factor for the  CFE component is  1.8085, or 894.7/(894.7 - 400). 
Using the same technique and -  400 as the value of the quality change for the 
GFE equipment, the quality factor is 0.8821, or 2,992/[2,992 -  (-400)].  On 
a 1975 = 100 base, the effect on the CFE fire control base price is + 163.2, 
and the effect on the other GFE base price is -  148.7. The technique calcu- 
lates  a  discrepancy  in  the  base  price  in  this  example  because  prices  have 
changed by different amounts in the two series. In other words, the relative 
importance of the two series has not remained constant. 
When attempting  to solve this problem,  the detail contained in the price 
source documents often prohibits  a simple  solution.  For  example, the  best 
way in which to solve the product switch problem is to group together over 
the life of the series those products that are involved  in the switch. This, in 
fact, was done for the CFE-GFE switch of navigation equipment in 198  1. 
Unfortunately,  switches usually involve nonspecific GFE data and more de- 
tailed  CFE data such as the fire control equipment switch mentioned above. 
In the case study, the 1987 switch is valued at 400. This value most likely was 
obvious  from the contractor  price report. Assuming  no quality adjustments 
due to a shift in contractor,  we then estimate the current effect on the GFE 
series as being -  400. In other words, no information was actually available 
about the price of the product when it was procured under GFE. In fact, it is 
only an assumption based on an odd GFE price change that the newly ob- 
served fire control  product  on the contractor  cost report was once included 
under the GFE series. Therefore, it would be impossible to group the GFE fire 
control equipment with the CFE fire control equipment over the life of the 
aircraft. 
The only way to solve the base price discrepancy problem in this case is to 
calculate a quality-adjustment value that will force the changes in the two base 
prices to offset. The calculation of the quality adjustment is explained best as 342  Richard C. Ziemer and Pamela A. Kelly 
a two-step procedure. First, the desired quality factor is derived by setting the 
base prices prior to the product switch equal to the base prices after the prod- 
uct switch. The quality valuation for one of the products must be available in 
order to solve the equation. 
The following list defines the variables used in the subsequent equations: 
a  = first product; 
b  = second product; 
M = cumulative quality factor before the switch; 
F  = quality factor for the switch; 
N  = non-quality-adjusted base price; 
B = current price of product, in the base year; 
R  = product of any quality factors after the switch year up to and including 
P  = price of product, at the time of the switch; and 
V  = value of quality for product,. 
031) 
or, solving for F,, 
the base year; 
MoNa + MbN, = MaF,N, f M,F,N,, 
MaNa + MbNb -  MaFoNa 
F, = 
Mb  Nb 
Fa is known because the quality valuation for producta was determined be- 
forehand. N, is also known for the same reason. If the product switch happens 
after the base year, then N, is known. If the product switch happens before the 
base year, then the following should be substituted for Nb  in the above equa- 
tion: 
B 
N, =  ~ 
MbFbRb' 
Solving for F,, the equation becomes 
(B4) 
B 
MaNaF,R, -t  B -  MaNaR,' 
F, = 
Then, for the second step, the quality factor equation is solved for the value 
of the quality change. In this case, the adjusted current price link equation is 
used: 
035) 
or, solving for Y 
(B6) 
P 
P - v' 
F, = ~ 
-P  + PF, 
V= 
Fb 343  Comment (chap. 10) 
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Comment  Arthur J. Alexander 
The goal of defense price estimates, according to Ziemer and Kelly, is to de- 
velop measures of constant-dollar defense purchases within the framework of 
the national income and product accounts. What is not stated is that constant- 
dollar purchases are proxies for physical items and quantities: a fundamental 
principle governing the conceptual basis  for estimating  constant-dollar  pur- 
chases is that, if the number of identical items purchzsed in two periods does 
not change, then the index of constant-dollar purchases should not change. 
This principle provides the rationale for many of  the assumptions and proce- 
dures described in the paper. 
Defense deflators and price indexes for individual products, while useful 
for many purposes in their own right, are produced here as means to achieve 
the main goal. However, it is in the calculation  of the price indexes that the 
central problem arises. This problem is the “performance/cost-of-production” 
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Views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and are not necessarily shared by JEI or its 
ton, D.C., a nonprofit research organization funded in part by the Japanese government. 
research sponsors. 344  Arthur J. Alexander 
method of quality adjustment. According to this method, products are exam- 
ined to determine whether they have changed from one period to another; if a 
change is determined to be associated with an increase in quality, “the cost of 
producing that physical change is taken as the value of the quality change, and 
the price is adjusted accordingly” (Ziemer and Kelly, chap. 10 in this volume, 
p. 310). Product characteristics and performance are used only to determine 
if there has been a quality improvement; they are not used to evaluate the size 
of the improvement. 
The use of cost as a measure of quality change ignores the possibility of 
improvements in technology and productivity and can severely overestimate 
price changes and underestimate output. Productivity in the design and pro- 
duction of military products can be substantial. Because of such productivity 
gains, newer and better products can actually be less costly to produce than 
older products. Under such conditions, the “performancekost-of-production” 
method would measure no change in quality. 
One example of an improved product costing less to produce was the FlOO 
turbojet engine used in the F-16 and F-15 aircraft. More than eighty design 
changes were incorporated in this engine over the four-year period 1984-87, 
resulting in significant improvements in reliability and maintainability: main- 
tenance manhours per flight hour were cut by  15 percent; unscheduled engine 
removals were reduced by 43 percent; support costs fell by one-third (Alex- 
ander 1988, 68). Yet the cost of these changes when introduced into produc- 
tion was actually negative-the  engine was less costly to produce. Indeed, in 
six case studies of  reliability  improvement, there were no examples of  cost 
increases. According to the Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) approach, 
these improvements in quality would not have been captured. 
The reason that the FlOO engine could be improved and quality increased 
with no increase in production cost was that the manufacturer, Pratt and Whit- 
ney,  had become smarter over the years-smarter  because of additional ex- 
perience and because of the $120 million in design and test expenditures that 
the U.S. Air Force invested in these design changes. These payoffs to research 
and development (R&D) are biased downward by the BEA approach. 
The problem faced by defense product price estimators is that price changes 
can arise from three sources: (1) changes in input factor costs; (2)  changes in 
the productivity of producing goods of a given quality; and (3) changes in the 
quality of the good. These changes are illustrated in figure 1OC. 1, where the 
solid lines represent time period 1 input factor costs (Wl)  and the dashed lines 
are for period 2 factor costs (W2). The observed points are A and B; A is on 
the line showing the nominal cost-quality relation at period 1 values of factor 
costs and productivity  levels. In period 2, the whole curve shifts downward 
because  of  productivity  improvements. The distance C4-C 1 represents  the 
shift in productivity; inflation in factor costs is captured by C2-Cl or C5X3 
(these need not be the same); the cost of quality improvement is C5-C2  or 
C3-C1.  Note that the BEA would measure the value of quality change as C4- 345  Comment (chap. 10) 






Fig. 1OC. 1 
input factor costs 
Cost-quality relations with changing levels of productivity and 
C3;  if this value were negative because of strong productivity growth, it would 
record no quality change at all. The approach therefore generates the paradox- 
ical outcome that, the larger the amount of productivity growth, the smaller 
the measured value of quality improvement.  Price deflators are therefore too 
high and the estimated  quality of output and calculated productivity growth 
too low. 
Does this actually occur? In order to test the possibility of biased estimates, 
I calculated the productivity change implicit in the fixed-weighted price index 
for aircraft (Ziemer and Kelly, chap. 10  in this volume, table 10.9); productiv- 
ity change was estimated by dividing an input factor cost index for aircraft by 
the  fixed-weighted  price  index.  From  1972 to 1982 (the years  for which  I 
happened to have a common set of data), input costs rose by 8.5 percent an- 
nually, while the aircraft price index (presumably,  holding quality constant) 
increased  at a 9.9 percent  rate-implying  that  military  aircraft production 
productivity actually fell by about 1.3 percent per year. Given the billions of 
R&D dollars devoted to military aircraft in each year’s defense budget,  this 
outcome is unlikely. Indeed, independent estimates of productivity for trans- 
port aircraft and jet engines showed annual productivity increases of 5.0 and 
2.0 percent (Alexander and Mitchell 1985, 186, 190). 
Unfortunately,  dealing with the problem of measuring quality change is far 
more difficult than simply describing it. Hedonic price indexes are probably 346  Arthur J. Alexander 
not feasible because of the sparse time series of most types of military equip- 
ment and because of the restricted market for defense equipment, where out- 
liers may persist for longer periods than in more competitive markets.  Some 
practitioners have used combat models to evaluate quality-quantity trade-offs 
for military aircraft, but these are applicable only to the gross characteristics 
of  equipment. One technique  that may be useful  has been  adopted in price 
surveys for the producer price index; this method requires manufacturers to 
estimate what it would have cost to produce the last-period model in the cur- 
rent period. The answer to this question is a measure of the distance C4-C2 
in figure 1OC. I.  Equivalently, the producer could also be asked what it would 
have cost to produce the current model in the last period; this question, how- 
ever, is more problematic since often a change is feasible only because of new 
technological  knowledge-it  could not  have  been  produced  earlier.  These 
kinds  of  questions  are feasible  for small product  improvements  of  a basic 
model. They become hypothetical when making comparisons across models, 
for example, from the F-4 to the F-16. 
For nonincremental  changes in military products,  it may be necessary to 
look at their several missions. For a highly simplified example, if one mission 
of  an attack aircraft is to drop bombs on targets,  its effectiveness  could be 
evaluated  as the number  of bombs on target per day, at a given range, per 
dollar of aircraft  capital cost and support cost. Calculation of  this  measure 
would  draw on such characteristics  as payload,  sensors,  flight control  sys- 
tems,  ordnance delivery  computers, reliability,  maintainability,  and  all the 
other design features and components that enable the aircraft to perform this 
mission. A weighted sum of all the missions would yield a quality index for 
the aircraft.  Just setting out such a simplified  approach to mission analysis 
gives a sense of the difficulty in implementing it, but it is the performance of 
the mission that ultimately lends value to the military equipment and to the 
notion of quality. Ultimately,  analysts will ignore mission performance only 
at their peril. 
Introducing  the  concept of  mission  in  evaluating the quality  of  military 
products forces one to consider the existence of enemies. If an enemy devel- 
ops a better  air-defense  system that reduces the effectiveness  of  an aircraft 
system, the quality of the aircraft declines; it becomes economically obsolete. 
If sold on secondhand markets, the price of the aircraft would fall to reflect its 
lower mission effectiveness. A similar effect would also be found for an anti- 
biotic whose quality  is measured  as the lethality against a certain strain of 
bacteria; if  a resistant  strain evolved,  the measured quality of the antibiotic 
would fall, as would its price. 
It would be theoretically correct to show that military products have value 
only in performing specified missions and that we may be spending more but 
getting less because of enemy reaction.  In a broader sense, the value of de- 
fense is a matter not only of constant-dollar purchases and productivity but 
also of the reactions of others. Correct and accurate measures of defense ex- 347  Comment (chap. 10) 
penditures that properly account for such reactions may reveal surprising pic- 
tures of the value of defense. 
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